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I. INTRODUCTION
An understanding of the basic principles that regulate the
formation of contracts is of great importance when trying to find
the most appropriate ways of forming a new contract or when
assessing the legality of an already existing contract. While the
basic rules that regulate contract formation are generally
applicable to all types of contracts regardless of the method
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utilized in their creation, there are some juridical rules that
apply specifically to those contracts created electronically.
The fundamental principles of contract formation in
American law can be found in the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC)1 although other laws have been enacted to regulate
electronic transactions generally following the same principles of
the UCC. Those laws are the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA) , the Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act (UETA),3 and the Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN).4  Under
international law there is the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),5 while
under Mexican law there is the C6digo de Comercio (Commerce
Code)6 and the C6digo Civil Federal (Federal Civil Code)7 as well
as other related statutes.
The objective of this article is to make a comparative
analysis of the aforementioned laws in relation to the main
elements involved in contract formation. An electronic contract
is an agreement created and "signed" through electronic means.
In other words, it is not necessary to use paper or some other
palpable type of copy. This can be carried out through e-mail or,
in forming an acceptance, when the party clicks on an icon that
indicates such an acceptance. s Although the laws are similar in
many aspects, they also have important differences that should
be analyzed more in depth.
The international doctrine on computer law distinguishes
1. See U.C.C. §§ 2-201-209 (2002).
2. See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 101:4 (2001) [hereinafter
U.C.I.T.A.].
3. See UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 4 (1999) [hereinafter U.E.T.A.].
4. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.SC.
§ 7001 (2000).
5. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 671 [hereinafter C.I.S.G.].
6. See C6DIGO DE COMERCIO [COD.COM.] art. 89 (Mex.).
7. See CODIGO CML FEDERAL [C.C.F.] art. 1803 (Mex.).
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between computerized contracts and those contracts created
through electronic, optical, or other technological means. 9 While
the former refers to those contracts, the content of which relates
to computer equipment (technical support contracts,
maintenance contracts, and others), the latter can be any type of
contract whose perfection takes place by electronic, optical, or
other technological means.1
It is appropriate first to make a brief review of the
important technological changes that affect commercialization
methods, which in turn leads us to observe from a juridical
perspective the increasing diffusion of electronic commerce.
Recent technological development has permitted the
appearance of new types of information and communication
means that have shaped what is known as the information
society.11 Gema Botana Garcia, an electronic commerce specialist
and professor at the prestigious Universidad Europea de
Madrid, indicates that the so called new information
technologies incorporate changes that substantially transform
the economy, human relations, culture, and politics in our
society, allowing us to speak about the first and fastest global
technological revolution. 12 The utilization of new communication
technologies, such as developmental instruments of electronic
commerce, gives obvious advantages, but also brings risks and
uncertainties to electronic contracting. 3 "Consequently, it is
necessary to find the adequate juridical] solutions that will
reduce, if not eliminate, said risks and uncertainties which are
inherent nowadays in transactions by electronic means and that
will allow for secure electronic commerce." 4
Juridically, it is possible to affirm that technological change
directs legislative change. Summarizing the legislation in the
9. MIGUEL ANGEL DAVARA RODRIGUEZ, MANUAL DE DERECHO INFORMATICO 191
(1997); JULIO TgLLEZ VALD8S, DERECHO INFORMATICO 95 (2d ed. 1996).
10. See C.C.F. art. 1805; CdD.COM. art. 80.
11. Gema Botana Garcfa, Noci6n de Comercio Electr6nico, in COMERCIO
ELECTRONICO Y PROTECCION DE LOS CONSUMIDORES 5, 5 (J. M. Badenas Carpio et al.
eds., 2001).
12. Id. at 58.
13. Id.
14. Id. (translated by autor).
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United States, as previously mentioned, in addition to the UCC
(whose second original article was considered the crown jewel of
the Code) and E-SIGN (which is a federal law), one can observe
the presence of two other relatively uniform laws on electronic
commerce available for adoption in all states. These two laws
are UETA and UCITA, both of which include substantial
differences in their content.
Authoritative sources, particularly Professor Arthur
Rosset-a well-respected American academician-assert that
UETA could be adopted by the states and would offer a flexible
framework for electronic commercial transactions in the United
States, at both state and national levels. Alternatively,
"UCITA's future is more problematic.., and will be a source of
controversy."1 5 Rosset finds the basis to affirm the former
statement in the formation process that was followed by both
laws and the interconnections between national and
international organizations that have worked to give the laws
shape. 16
The following commentaries, stated by the same author, will
explain the above statements. The purpose of UETA is to
supplement the existing legislation for the limited purpose of
using electronic media for determinate transactions while not
changing the substantive law of these transactions in other
17
aspects. In other words, UETA is foreseen as a group of
procedural rules, with the intention of making electronic
transactions equivalent in every way to documented
transactions, while leaving the rules on the formation of
contracts unchanged. i Additionally, UETA captures United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Model Law on Electronic Commerce 9 as its basis both in form
15. Arthur Rosset, La Regulaci6n Legislativa del Comercio Electr6nico: Una
Perspectiva Norteamericana, 8 REVISTA DE LA CONTRATACION ELECTRONICA [RCE] 21, 26
(2000).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 34.
18. Id. at 32.
19. See UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, U.N. GAOR 51" Sess.,
85h plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/51/162 (1996).
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and in content.2 °
Rosset continues by indicating that, in contrast to UETA,
the document which came to be known as UCITA could not be
considered simply at a procedural level because its editors
adopted a substantive approach that presented conflicts with
more fundamental issues.2' In addition, the majority of people
involved in this project had strong professional ties linking them
22 23to commercial interests, and few identified with consumers.
The version of the document that became UCITA generated
controversy and strong criticism from groups of consumers who
believed that it perfectly adapted itself to the interests of the
24
computer programming industry.
In Mexico, reality forced legislative activity to properly
recognize and regulate data exchange by electronic, optical, or
other technological means where the creation, transmission,
modification, or termination of rights and obligations can be
addressed. The documents relating to electronic commerce and
electronic signatures in Mexico are: Ley de Instituciones de
Crddito (LIC); 25 Ley del Mercado de Valores (LMV);26 Ley de
Adquisiciones, Arrendamientos y Servicios del Sector Pliblico
(LAASSP);27 Ley de Obras Piiblicas y Servicios Relacionados con
las Mismas (LOPSRM); 28 C6digo Civil Federal (CCF);29 C6digo
Federal de Procedimientos Civiles (CFPC);30 C6digo de Comercio
20. See, e.g., U.E.T.A. § 2 (1999); see also Rosset, supra note 15, at 32.




25. LEY DE INSTITUCIONES DE CREDITO [L.I.C.] arts. 52, 57, 101 (Mex.). The
credit institutions will be able to agree... on the use of equipment, optical, or electronic
means or of other technology .... The use of identification methods that are established
according to this Article, in substitution of a written signature, will produce the same
effects that the law provides to such documents and, consequently, will have the same
legal value. See id. art. 52.
26. LEY DEL MERCADO DE VALORES [L.M.V.] arts. 26, bis 8 91, 100 (Mex.).
27. LEY DE ADQUISICIONES, ARRENDAMIENTOS Y SERVICIOS DEL SECTOR
PIOBLICO [L.A.A.S.S.P.] arts. 26, 27, 29, 31, 56, 65, 67 (Mex.).
28. LEY DE OBRAS POBLICAS Y SERVICIOS RELACIONADOS CON LAS MISMAS
[L.O.P.S.R.M.] arts. 27, 28, 31, 33, 74, 83, 85 (Mex.).
29. C.C.F. arts. 1803, 1805, 1811, 1834 bis (Mex.).
30. CODIGO FEDERAL DE PROCEDIMIENTOS CIVILES [C.F.P.C.] art. 210-A (Mex.).
[Vol. 26:1
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(CC); 31 Ley Federal de Protecci6n al Consumidor (LFPC);32and
Ley Federal de Procedimiento Administrativo (LFPA).33
II. FIELD OF APPLICATION
34
The UCC 35 is utilized in transactions involving goods or
personal property, but does not apply to transactions that,
although taking the form of a contract of sale and purchase, are
carried out with the intent of operating only as securityS 36
transactions. Article 2 applies only to contracts connected with
the present or future sale of goods.3 ' Generally, dispositions
contained in Article 2 are applicable only to contracts for the
sale of goods with a value of $500 or more.38 In such transactions
the UCC dictates several requirements, most importantly that
such contracts be in writing.39 The term "goods," under this law,
refers to movable personal property, unborn young of animals,
and growing crops.4° When the transaction includes the buying
and selling of goods in conjunction with services, the UCC
applies only in cases where the primary purpose of entering into
the contract is to obtain goods.41
On the other hand, the CISG is applicable to the formation
of contracts for the buying and selling of goods between parties
whose principle places of business are in different countries that
have ratified this Convention.42 Alternatively, the CISG applies
"Information created or communicated by electronic, optical or other technological means
will be recognized as proof." Id.
31. See COD.COM. arts. 21 his, 80, 89, 1205, and 1298-A (Mex.).
32. LEY FEDERAL DE PROTECCION AL CONSUMIDOR [L.F.P.C.] arts. 1, 76 his
(Mex.).
33. LEY FEDERAL DO PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO [L.F.P.A.] art. 69 (Mex.).
34. Reference, infra, TABLE 1: FIELD OF APPLICATION.
35. The UCC has been adopted by all of the states, including the U.S. Virgin
Islands. U.C.C. § 1-101:2 (2002).
36. U.C.C. § 2-102 (2002).
37. Id. § 2-106(1).
38. Id. § 2-201(1).
39. Id.
40. See id. § 2-105(1).
41. See, e.g., Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 795 (N.Y. 1954).
42. C.I.S.G., Apr. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 671, art. 1(1). As of August 20, 2003, 62
countries have adopted this convention: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium,
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"when the rules of private international law lead to the
application of the law of a Contracting State. 43 Additionally,
the fact that the parties have their places of
business in different States is to be disregarded
whenever this fact does not appear either from the
contract or from any dealing between, or from
information disclosed by, the parties at any time
before or at the conclusion of the contract.44
"Neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or
commercial character of the parties or of the contract is to be
taken into consideration in determining the application of this
Convention."45 Generally, there are three essential requirements
for its application: the contract must have been formed after
January 1, 1988; the parties must have their principle places of
business in different nations; and both nations must be
signatories to the CISG.46 This Convention is not applicable to
transactions related to the sale of goods for personal, familial, or
household uses unless the seller did not know and had no way of
41knowing that the goods would be used for such purposes.
Neither does the CISG apply to transactions related to stocks,
shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments and
money, ships, vessels, hovercrafts, aircrafts, or electricity.48
Under the CISG, "contracts for the supply of goods to be
manufactured... are to be considered sales, unless the party
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Croatia, Cuba,
Czech Rep., Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Kyrgystan, Latvia,
Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent &
Grenadine, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Uganda,
Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia, Zambia. Albert H. Kritzer,
CISG: Table of Contracting States, at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html (last updated Aug. 28, 2003).
43. C.I.S.G. art. 1(1).
44. Id. at art. 1(2).
45. Id. at art. 1(3).
46. Gary Kenji Nakata, Filanto S.P.A. v. Chilewhich International Corporation:
Sounds of Silence Bellow Forth Under the CISG's International Battle of the Forms, 7
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 141, 147 (1994).
47. C.I.S.G., art. 2.
48. Id.
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who ordered the goods undertakes to supply a substantial part
of the materials necessary for such manufacture or
production. 4 9 The decrees of the CISG do "not apply to contracts
in which the preponderant part of the obligations of the party
who furnishes the goods consists [of] the supply of labour [sic] or
other services. 5 0 Additionally, the CISG does not contain
decrees related to: the validity of the contract;, the effect the
contract may have on the goods sold;51 or "the liability of the
seller for [the] death or personal injury caused by the goods to
any person."
52
Approved in 2000, UCITA applies to computer information
transactions,53 which are defined under this Act as transactions
formed with the intent to create, modify, transfer, or license
computer information obtained in a manner capable of being
processed by a computer.54 In UCITA, the term "computer
information" means "information in electronic form which is
obtained from or through the use of a computer or which is in a
form capable of being processed by a computer" and "includes a
copy of the information and any documentation or packaging
associated with the copy.,
55
UCITA indicates that, should a "transaction include[]
computer information and goods, this [Act] applies to the part of
the transaction involving computer information, informational
rights in it, and creation or modification of it." 56 In all other
cases, "this [Act] applies to the entire transaction if the
computer information and informational rights, or access to
them, is the primary subject matter ... .""' Among other things,
UCITA does not apply to a financial services transaction, or an
agreement for the creation, acquisition, use, distribution,
49. Id. art. 3(1).
50. Id. art. 3(2).
51. Id. art. 4.
52. Id. art. 5.
53. U.C.I.T.A. § 103(a) (2001). To date, this law has been adopted only in
Virginia and Maryland. Id.
54. See id. § 102(a)(11).
55. Id. § 102(a)(10).
56. Id. § 103(b)(1).
57. Id. § 103(b)(3).
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modification, reproduction, adaptation, transmission, or display
of audio or visual programming. 58
UCITA also does not apply to motion pictures, sound
recordings, musical works, or phonorecords. 9 Equally, a contract
of employment of an individual is not regulated by this Act. 60 It
is also worth mentioning that if UCITA were to conflict with
Article 9 of the UCC (related to financial services transactions),
the UCC would govern. 6' Generally, but with several exceptions,
"a contract requiring payment of [a contract fee of] $5,000 or
more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless" a
record exists that a contract has been formed.62
UETA applies to electronic records and electronic signatures
63
relating to transactions. In UETA, an "electronic signature
means an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or
logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a
person with the intent to sign the record."64 Nevertheless, this
Act does not apply to a transaction to the extent it is governed
by Article 2 of the UCC or to the extent that UCITA applies. 65
E-SIGN gives validity to contracts and other documents
signed in electronic form and involved in interstate or foreign
commerce. 66 Nevertheless, this Act does not require any person
to agree to use or accept electronic records or electronic
58. Id. § 103(d)(3)(A).
59. Id. § 103(d)(3)(B).
60. Id. § 103(d)(5).
61. Id. § 103(c); see also U.C.C. § 9-109 (2002) (stating that the Article applies to
any transaction that is related to the transfer of personal property interests in contract,
among other things).
62. U.C.I.T.A. § 201(a)(1) (2001).
63. U.E.T.A. § 3 (1999). This Act has been adopted by the following states:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, at http://www.nccusl.orglnccuslluniformact-
factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ueta.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2003).
64. U.E.T.A. § 2(8).
65. Id. §§ 3(b)(2)-(3).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a).
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signatures.67 E-SIGN also indicates that if a statute, regulation,
or other rule of law requires that information relating to a
transaction be provided and made available to a consumer in
writing, the use of an electronic record to provide or to make
available such information satisfies the requirement that the
information be in writing if the consumer has affirmatively
consented to its use and has not withdrawn consent.68
Additionally, E-SIGN applies to the retention of documents. In
other words, when
a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires
that a contract or other record relating to a
transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce be retained, that requirement is met by
retaining an electronic record of the information
in the contract or other record that accurately
reflects the information set forth in the contract or
other record; and remains accessible to all persons
who are entitled to access by statute, regulation,
or rule of law.69
Alternatively, E-SIGN does not apply to "court orders or notices,
or official court documents ... required to be executed in
connection with court proceedings."7 ° It also does not apply to
"any notice of the cancellation or termination of utility services
(including water, heat, and power); default, acceleration,
repossession... or the cancellation or termination of health
insurance or life insurance benefits."7' In states where UETA
has been adopted, it can be applied and used to replace E-SIGN
provisions.7 2 Finally, E-SIGN does not apply to a contract or
other record to the extent it is governed by the UCC.
73
In Mexico, with respect to application of the LIC, reference
can be made to utilization of electronic identification means that
67. Id. § 7001(b)(2).
68. Id. § 7001(c)(1)(A).
69. Id. § 7001(d)(1)(A) - (B).
70. Id. § 7003(b)(1).
71. Id. § 7003(b)(2)(A)-(C).
72. Id. § 7002(a)(1).
73. Id. § 7003(a)(3).
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have the same validity as a written signature.14 The LMV refers
to utilization of electronic or computer means for instructing on
the field of financial contracts. Application of the LAASSP
addresses the possibility of presenting bids from the public
• • • 76
sector through electronic means using electronic identification.
The juridical value of the offer and acceptance expressed in
electronic, optical, or other technological format allowing for
immediate expression is considered under the LOPSRM1 7 The• 78
CCF considers the possibility of using electronic signatures. A
determination under the CFPC addresses the moment when an
acceptance is created, sent, received, or filed through electronic,
optical, or other technological means.7 9 The regulation of the
moment in which an acceptance is considered received through
electronic, optical, or other technological means is determined
under the CC.80 The LFPC considers the recognition and rules to
determine the probative value of information created, sent,
received, filed, or communicated through electronic, optical, or
other technological means.8 ' Finally, the LFPA addresses
dispositions regarding the protection of consumers of goods and
services made through electronic, optical, or other technological
82
means.
It is also worth mentioning that the regulation of the
certification process needed to allow a physical person to obtain
an electronic signature was recently passed and published in the
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n on August 29, 2003, and will
become effective ninety days after that date-these amendments
to the Mexican Commercial Code essentially adopt the
principals provided by UNCITRAL. 3
74. L.I.C. art. 52 (Mex.).
75. L.M.V. art. 91(V) (Mex.).
76. L.A.A.S.S.P. art. 27 (Mex.); L.O.P.S.R.M. art. 28 (Mex.).
77. C.C.F. art. 1805 (Mex.).
78. See id. art. 1834-bis; COD.CoM. arts. 21-bis, 30-bis (Mex.); L.F.P.A. art. 69
(Mex.).
79. C.C.F. art. 1805; COD.CoM. art. 80.
80. C6D.COM. art. 91.
81. C.F.P.C. art. 210-A (Mex.); COD.CoM. arts. 1205, 1298-A.
82. L.F.P.C. art. 76-bis (Mex.).
83. "Decreto por el que se reformen y adicionian diversas disposiciones del
C6digo de Comercio en Materia de Firma Electr6nica," D.O., 29 de Agosto de 2003; GAOR
[Vol. 26:1
2003] COMPARATIVE STUDY-ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS 75
III. AUTONOMY OF THE PARTS (EXCLUSIONS, EXCEPTIONS, AND
MODIFICATIONS)84
Article 2 of the UCC does not contain any provision
explicitly stating how to exclude its application in transactions
involving goods. However, Article 1 indicates that, when a
transaction bears a reasonable relation to one state and also to
another state or nation, the parties may agree that the law of
either state or nation shall govern their rights and duties 
8 5
"Failing such an agreement, [the UCC] applies to transactions
bearing an appropriate relation to th[e] state."86 Additionally,
the effect of the provisions of this Act may be
varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided
in this Act and except that the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care
prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by
agreement but the parties may by agreement
determine the standards by which the
performance of such obligations is to be measured
if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable. 7
Similarly, the CISG allows the parties to exclude its application
18
or to vary the effect of any of its provisions.
UCITA also gives the parties the option to choose the
applicable law to apply to their transactions unless a rule within
that jurisdiction forbids it. 9 The Act indicates that this "choice is
not enforceable in a consumer contract to the extent it would
vary a rule that may not be varied by agreement under the law
of the jurisdiction whose law would apply ... in the absence of
the agreement."90 UCITA also determines which jurisdiction's
law governs in all respects for purposes of contract law "in the
Res. 51/162, supra note 20.
84. Reference, infra, TABLE 2:AUTONOMY OF PARTS.
85. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (2002).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 1-102(3).
88. C.I.S.G., Apr. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 671, art. 6.
89. U.C.I.T.A. § 109(a) (2001).
90. Id.
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absence of an enforceable agreement on choice of law."9'
UETA is a little more general in its provisions with regard
to its application. For example, UETA makes clear that it "does
not require a record or signature to be created, generated, sent,
communicated, received, stored, or otherwise processed or used
by electronic means."92 UETA indicates that its application is
purely voluntary and depends on mutual agreement between the
parties to conduct transactions by electronic means.9 It also
indicates that "[w]hether the parties agree to conduct a
transaction by electronic means is determined from the context
and surrounding circumstances, including the parties'
conduct."94 UETA also indicates that, even when a party has
agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means, that a party
95may refuse to conduct other transactions by electronic means.
Further, "the right[s] granted by this provision may not be
waived by agreement., 96 Generally, however, most other
provisions of UETA may be varied by agreement.
97
E-SIGN does not "require any person to agree to use or
accept electronic records or electronic signatures, other than a
governmental agency with respect to a record other than a
contract to which it is a party."9 8 Also, E-SIGN indicates that
when "a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires that
information relating to a transaction or transactions ... [be]
made available ... in writing, the use of an electronic record to
provide or make available ... such information satisfies the
requirement that such information be in writing if' the
consumer consents. 99
As previously mentioned, in Mexico, on civil as well as
commercial matters, there is no need for a previous agreement
between contracting parties for information created, sent,
91. Id. § 109(b).
92. U.E.T.A. § 5(a) (1999).
93. See id. § 5(b).
94. Id.
95. Id. § 5(c).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 5(d).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(b)(2).
99. Id. § 7001(c)(1)(A).
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received, or filed through electronic, optical, or other
technological means, to take effect.100
IV. FORMATION OF THE ELECTRONIC CONTRACT
A. The Offer 01
An offer can be defined as "a declaration of receptive intent,
which being sufficiently definite, aims toward the perfection of
the contract by means of the concurrence with the statement of
the recipient of the proposal."0 2 The absence of any of these
elements implies that existence of the contract cannot be
established or perfected.
10 3
The UCC establishes that
an offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a
signed writing which by its terms gives assurance
that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack
of consideration, during the time stated or if no
time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no
event may such period of irrevocability exceed
three months.1 4
With regard to the elements of the offer, the UCC also indicates
that "an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting
acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances." °5 Additionally, the UCC explains that an "offer
to buy goods for prompt or current shipment shall be construed
as inviting acceptance [whether] by a prompt promise to ship or
100. C.C.F. art. 1811 (Mex.). See also COD.COM. art. 80 (Mex.) (stating that
agreements and mercantile contracts created by correspondence, telegraph, or electronic
means will be complete at the time of receipt of acceptance of the proposal or the
conditions with which it has been modified).
101. Reference, infra, TABLE 3(a): FORMATION OF THE ELECTRONIC CONTRACT:
THE OFFER.
102. Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Formaci6n del Contrato Electr6nico, in
REGIMEN JURfDICO DE INTERNET 875, 886-87 (Javier Cremades et al. eds. 2002).
103. The term "perfection" in this article is used to describe the consummation
or execution of a contract without defect. Although more commonly used in the field of
secured transactions, the term was chosen as a more accurate description of the act of
fulfilling all legal requirements for the formation of a contract.
104. U.C.C. § 2-205 (2002).
105. Id. § 2-206(1)(a).
HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W
by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or non-
conforming goods ....,,6
With regard to the offer, the CISG considers that a "proposal
for concluding a contract addressed to one or more specific
persons constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and
indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of
acceptance. "107 Such a proposal is "sufficiently definite if it
indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes
provisions for determining the quantity and the price. 108 Such
"an offer becomes effective when it reaches the offeree" but can
be withdrawn, even if irrevocable, "if the withdrawal reaches the
offeree before or at the same time as the offer." 109 "An offer, even
if it is irrevocable, is terminated when a rejection reaches the
offeror."' ° Also, any offer can be revoked until the contract is
concluded, so long as "the revocation reaches the offeree before
he has dispatched an acceptance.""' However, "an offer cannot
be revoked if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for its
acceptance or otherwise, that it is irrevocable; or if it was
reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being
irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer."
1 2
With regard to an offer, UCITA indicates that "an offer to
make a contract invites acceptance in any manner and by any
medium reasonable under the circumstances" unless otherwise
unambiguously indicated by the language or the
circumstances."13 "An order or other offer to acquire a copy for
prompt or current delivery invites acceptance by either a prompt
promise to ship or a prompt or current shipment of a conforming
or nonconforming copy."" 4 An offer, like an acceptance, "is
conditional if it is conditioned on agreement by the other party
106. Id. § 2-206(1)(b).
107. C.I.S.G., Apr. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 671, art. 14(1).
108. Id.
109. Id. art. 15(1)-(2).
110. Id. art. 17.
111. Id. art. 16(1).
112. Id. art. 16(2)(a)-(b).
113. U.C.I.T.A. § 203(1) (2001).
114. Id. § 203(2).
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to all the terms of the offer or acceptance." 5 At the same time,
"a conditional offer or acceptance precludes formation of a
contract unless the other party agrees to its terms." 6
UETA does not include any rules or terms specifically
related to the offer; it only authorizes the use of records or
electronic signatures in the formation of contracts."7
Similarly, the legal effect of E-SIGN is limited to the use of
electronic signatures, contracts, or other records affecting
interstate or foreign commerce."18 However, E-SIGN does not
affect any other rule or law that regulates the formation of
contracts except to allow for the use of electronic medium for its
formation." 9 This Act indicates that it does not "affect[] the
content or timing of any disclosure or other record required to be
provided or made available to any consumer under any statute,
regulation, or other rule of law."20
In Mexico, in relation to the offer or proposition, one must
determine whether the offer was made between present or
absent parties, whether a time frame was fixed, and whether the
offer was made through a telegraph or other electronic, optical,
or other technological means. For this reason, if an offer is made
in person without setting a time for acceptance, the offeror is not
bound if an acceptance is not given immediately. The same rule
applies to offers by telephone or other electronic, optical, or
technological means that allow an immediate acceptance.121 It
must also be noted that immediacy cannot take place in
communications through e-mail, fax, or telefax. When the offer
is made between present parties with a fixed time frame, the
offeror is bound by his offer until the expiration of that time
period.
122
In an offer made to a person not physically present and
without a time period for its acceptance, the offeror is bound for
115. Id. § 205(a).
116. Id. § 205(b).
117. See U.E.T.A. §§ 2(16), 3(a), 4 (1999).
118. See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a).
119. See id. § 7001(a)(1).
120. Id. § 7001(c)(2)(A).
121. C.C.F.art. 1805 (Mex.).
122. Id. art. 1804.
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three days plus the time necessary for the public mail to deliver
the offer to the place of the offeree and back. 123 Alternatively, in
the absence of public mail, the offeror is bound for sufficient
delivery time in accordance with the distances and the available
124
communication channels between the parties. An offer is
considered not made if it is withdrawn by the offeror and such
withdrawal is received by the offeree prior to the offer; the same
rule applies when the acceptance is withdrawn.1 25 If prior to the
acceptance the offeror dies and the offeree has no knowledge of
the death, the offeror's heirs become obligated by the contract if
accepted. 126
The offeror is released from his offer if the acceptance is not
clear and plain, but contains modifications to the offer. 27 In that
case, the response is considered a new offer and is governed by
the provisions of other related articles.
28
An offer and acceptance made by telegraph are effective if
the contracting parties previously agreed in writing to this way
of contracting, and if the original copy of the telegram contains
the parties' signature and the appropriate codes agreed to by
them. 129
B. The Acceptance3 '
The acceptance can be defined as "a manifestation of will by
which the offeree shows agreement with the offer."' 3' The law
appears to recognize three acceptable ways of accepting an offer:
expressly accepting; impliedly accepting; or tacitly accepting
through the silence or inaction of the offeree. It would be
convenient to mention that the statutes of various countries
consider that any consent through electronic means falls within
123. Id. art. 1806.
124. Id.
125. Id. art. 1808.
126. Id. art. 1809.
127. Id. art. 1810.
128. Id.
129. Id. art. 1811.
130. Reference, infra, TABLE 3(b):FORMATION OF THE ELECTRONIC CONTRACT:
THE ACCEPTANCE.
131. Viscasillas, supra note 103, at 902.
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the expressed declarations of intent.
132
In accordance with the UCC, an acceptance can be
accomplished in any manner and by any medium reasonable
under the circumstances. 33 The "shipment of non-conforming
goods does not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably
notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only as an
accommodation to the buyer."134 With regard to acceptance of the
offer, the UCC also indicates that a definite and timely
acceptance or a written confirmation sent within a reasonable
time is considered valid even if "it states terms additional to or
different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or
different terms."35
With regard to acceptance, the CISG indicates that an
acceptance can be "a statement made by or other conduct of the
offeree indicating assent to an offer .... ,,136 However, in
situations where the parties have previously carried out several
contracts between them, courts have decided that not objecting
to a certain term is a valid acceptance.137
An acceptance becomes effective at the moment it reaches
the offeror so long as acceptance occurs within the terms
indicated in the contract, or if the contract does not establish a
definite period, a reasonable time under the circumstances. 3 8 In
some cases "the offeree may indicate assent by performing an
act, such as one relating to the dispatch of the goods or payment
of the price, without notice to the offeror. . ." and as a result of
the established practices or usage.139 The preceding would
become effective at the moment the acceptance is performed,
provided it is performed within the period of time laid down or,
if no deadline is set, within a reasonable time.
4 0
132. Id. at 902-03.
133. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) (2002).
134. Id. § 2-206(1)(b).
135. Id. § 2-207(1).
136. C.I.S.G., Apr. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 671, art. 18(1).
137. See Nakata, supra note 47, at 156.
138. C.I.S.G. art. 18(2).
139. Id. art. 18(3).
140. Id. art. 18(2)-(3).
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The CISG also indicates that "a late acceptance is
nevertheless effective as an acceptance if without delay the
offeror orally informs the offeree or dispatches a notice to that
effect."14' An exception to this is if the offeror informs the offeree
without an unjustifiable delay that the offer has lapsed.1 42
With regard to the acceptance, UCITA indicates that
a person manifests assent to a record or term if
the person, acting with knowledge of, or after
having an opportunity to review the record or
term . . ., authenticates the record or term with
intent to adopt or accept it; or intentionally
engages in conduct or makes statements with
reason to know that the other party or its
electronic agent may infer from the conduct or
statement that the person assents to the record or
term.'43
Basically, the same requirements apply to acceptance through
an electronic agent.
144
UETA states that "if the beginning of a requested
performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance, an offeror that
is not notified of acceptance or performance within a reasonable
time may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance."
14
"If an offer in an electronic message evokes an electronic
message accepting the offer, a contract is considered formed:
when an electronic acceptance is received; or. . ." if the response
consists of beginning or full performance, when the performance
is received.
146
Under UETA, an electronic record is received when "it
enters an information processing system that the recipient has
141. Id. art. 21(1).
142. See id. art. 21(2),
143. U.C.I.T.A. § 112(a)(1)-(2) (2001).
144. Compare id. § 112(b)(1)-(2) (limiting assent through an electronic agent to
situations where the agent either authenticates the record or performs operations that
indicate acceptance), with id. § 112(a)(1)' (2) (limiting assent through a person to
situations where the person either authenticates the record or engages in conduct that
indicates assent).
145. Id. § 203(3).
146. Id. § 203(4).
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designated or uses for the purpose of receiving electronic records
or information of the type sent and from which the recipient is
able to retrieve the electronic record."147 An electronic record is
received "even if no individual is aware of its receipt."
1 48
E-SIGN establishes that when a statute, regulation, or other
rule of law requires information relating to a transaction be
made available in writing, the consumer should affirmatively
consent to the use of an electronic record. 49 Before consenting to
the application of this law, the consumer should receive a clear
and conspicuous statement informing the consumer of any right
or option to have the record provided or made available on paper
or in non-electronic form, and of his right to withdraw his
consent to the use of electronic means in his transactions.5 0
In Mexico, with regard to acceptance, one must determine
whether it was made between present or absent parties,
whether a timeframe was fixed, and whether it was made
through a telegraph or other electronic, optical, or other
technological means.
For this reason, an acceptance made between parties
physically present without a fixed time period must be made
immediately. This same rule applies to offers made through any
electronic, optical, or other technological means that allow for an
immediate offer and acceptance.' 5 If acceptance does not take
place immediately, the offeror is not bound by the offer.5 2
Communications made via e-mail, fax, or telefax are not
considered immediate.
When acceptance is made between two parties physically
present and with a fixed time period, acceptance must occur
within that time period. 53 In an acceptance between two parties
not physically present and without a fixed time period,
acceptance must take place before the offeror withdraws the
147. U.E.T.A. § 15(b) (1999).
148. Id. § 15(e).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1)(A).
150. Id. § 7001(c)(1)(B)(i).
151. C.C.F. art. 1805 (Mex.).
152. Id.
153. Id. art. 1804.
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offer and the offeree becomes aware of such withdrawal.1 54 An
acceptance can be withdrawn as long as the offeror is notified
before receiving the acceptance.155 If, prior to acceptance, the
offeror dies and the offeree has no knowledge of the death, the
offeror's heirs become obligated by the contract if it is
accepted. 1 56
If the acceptance is not clear and plain, or contains
modifications to the offer, the offeror is released from his offer.
1 57
In this case, the response is considered a new offer and is
governed by the provisions of other related articles.
1 58
An offer or acceptance by telegraph is effective only if the
parties previously agreed in writing to contract in this manner,
and if original copies of the respective telegraphs bear the
signatures of the contracting parties and the appropriate codes
agreed to by them. 59 Regarding offers and acceptances made by
electronic, optical, or other technological means, a previous
agreement between the contracting parties is not required for
these means to be effective.
C. The Perfection16
Under Mexican law-"perfected" means the exact moment
when a contract acquires juridical life-the contract is perfected
at the moment the offer is accepted without modification. There
are four theories that govern the precise moment of contract
perfection: declaration; dispatch; reception; and understanding
or information. 1 For electronic contracts-independent of the
civil or commercial nature of the contract and its national or
international scope of application-the reception theory
determines the moment the contract closes. These rules are a
154. See id. art. 1808.
155. Id.
156. Id. art. 1809.
157. Id. art. 1810.
158. Id.
159. Id. art. 1811.
160. Reference, infra, TABLE 3(c): FORMATION OF THE ELECTRONIC CONTRACT:
THE CONCLUSION.
161. See 1 MANUEL BORJA SORIANO, TEORIA GENERAL DE LAS
OBLIGACIONES 146-47 (7th ed. 1971).
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result of the study and analysis of contract perfection in various
national statutes, such as the CISG, and of the fact that contract
criteria today is universally accepted.
62
The UCC indicates that "a contract for the sale of goods may
be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including
conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a
contract."163 This law indicates that "an agreement sufficient to
constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the
moment of its making is undetermined." 164 The UCC goes
further in sustaining contract creation by indicating that, even
when one or more terms are left open, a contract for sale does
not fail for indefiniteness if there is a reasonable way of solving
the controversy.1
65
The CISG requires more before granting validity to a
contract. Generally, the CISG requires an offer and a valid
acceptance before a contact is created. The contract is not valid
until it has been perfected, and it is perfected at the moment an
acceptance becomes effective in accordance with the CISG
provisions. 166 Under the CISG, contract perfection is considered
to occur when any "declaration of acceptance or any other
indication of intention 'reaches' the addressee when it is made
orally to him or delivered by any other means to him
personally .... ,,167
UCITA similarly indicates that "a contract may be formed in
any manner sufficient to show agreement, including offer and
acceptance or conduct of both parties or operations of electronic
agents that recognize the existence of a contract."16 It also
indicates, in a manner similar to the UCC stipulation, that
if the parties so intend, an agreement sufficient to
constitute a contract may be found even if the
162. Viscasillas, supra note 103, at 919-20. But see id. at 920, n.116 (noting
that common law may apply either the mailbox rule or the reception theory to determine
the precise moment of perfection).
163. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2002).
164. Id. § 2-204(2).
165. Id. § 2-204(3).
166. C.I.S.G., Apr. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 671, art. 23.
167. Id. art. 24.
168. U.C.I.T.A. § 202(a) (2001).
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time of its making is undetermined, one or more of
its terms are left open or to be agreed on, the
records of the parties do not otherwise establish a
contract, or one party reserves the right to modify
its terms.
169
However, UCITA indicates that a contract has not been formed
if there is disagreement over a material or principal term,
including the contract's scope of application.7 °
UETA provides that "a record or signature may not be
denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in
electronic form" and extends the provision to prevent contract
denial solely for electronic form.' 17 UETA also establishes that if
the "parties have agreed to conduct a transaction by electronic
means and a law requires a person to provide ... information in
writing to another person, the requirement is satisfied if the
information is provided, sent, or delivered ... in an electronic
record capable of retention by the recipient at the time of
receipt."
172
E-SIGN states that "the legal effectiveness, validity, or
enforceability of any contract executed by a consumer shall not
be denied solely because of the failure to obtain electronic
"'173consent or confirmation of consent by that consumer ....
In Mexico, in civil and commercial matters, a contract is
formed the moment the offeror receives acceptance. 174 In 2000,
the Mexican Commercial Code abandoned the theory of dispatch
that originally prevailed. 175 Moreover, in business matters, if
acceptance is communicated by electronic, optical, or other
technological means, the time of acceptance is determined by the
following: if the offeror has designated an information system for
reception, the acceptance takes place the moment it enters such
system; or in case the acceptance is sent to a system that is not
the designated one for its reception or where there is no
169. Id. § 202(b).
170. Id. § 202(d).
171. U.E.T.A. § 7(a)-(b) (1999).
172. Id. § 8(a).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(3).
174. See C.C.F. art. 1805 (Mex.); see also COD.COM. art. 80 (Mex.).
175. See COD.CoM. art. 80.
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information system available, the acceptance is considered
received the moment the offeror obtains the information. 176
V. ADDITIONAL OR DIFFERENT TERMS IN A CONTRACT177
Under the UCC, if the contract is between merchants,
additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to
the contact unless: the offer expressly limits acceptance to its
terms; the added terms materially alter the contract; or
notification of objection to the added terms is given within a
reasonable time after alteration. 17 8 The additional terms should
be construed only as proposals for additions to the contract.
179
When the conduct of both parties establishes existence of a
contract, but the writings do not so indicate, the terms of the
contract consist of those in agreed writings of the parties.'80
The CISG, in contrast, provides that "a reply to an offer that
purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations
or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a
counter-offer." 181 However, if changes or additions to the offer do
not materially alter the terms of the offer, acceptance is valid
unless the offeror, without undue delay, objects orally to the
discrepancy or sends a notice to that effect. 182 "If he does not so
object, the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer with
the modifications contained in the acceptance."8 3 The CISG
considers that "additional or different terms relating, among
other things, to the price, payment, quality and quantity of the
goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one party's liability
to the other, or the settlement of disputes ... alter the terms of
the offer materially."'84
Similarly, UCITA states, "an acceptance materially alters an
176. Id. art. 91.
177. Reference, infra, TABLE 4: TERMS ADDITIONAL OR DIFFERENT FROM THE
CONTRACT.
178. U.C.C. §§ 2-207(2)(a)-(c) (2002).
179. Id. § 2-207(2).
180. Id. § 2-207(3).
181. C.I.S.G., Apr. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 671, art. 19(1).
182. Id. art. 19(2).
183. Id.
184. Id. art. 19(3).
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offer if it contains a term that materially conflicts with or varies
a term of the offer or that adds a material term not contained in
the offer."185 If the acceptance materially alters the offer, a
contract is not formed unless "a party agrees. . . to the other
party's offer or acceptance; or all the other circumstances,
including the conduct of the parties, establish a contract." 186 "If
an acceptance varies from but does not materially alter the offer,
a contract is formed based on the terms of the offer."187
Additionally, the "terms in the acceptance which conflict with
terms in the offer are not part of the contract.",8 8 "An additional
nonmaterial term in the acceptance is a proposal for an
additional term." 89 Similar to the UCC, UCITA indicates that
"between merchants, the proposed additional term becomes part
of the contract unless the offeror gives notice of objection before,
or within a reasonable time after, it receives the proposed
terms."'90
According to UETA, "the effect of any of its provisions may
be varied by agreement."' 9' Although E-SIGN does not contain
any specific terms with regard to exchange of additional or
different elements of the contract, E-SIGN does indicate that its
application does not limit, alter, or otherwise affect any
requirement imposed by a statute, regulation or rule of law. 92
As mentioned previously, in Mexico, when acceptance is not
plain and clear, or contains modifications to the offer, the offeror
is released from his offer. In that instance, the response is
considered a new offer and is governed by provisions of other
related articles 93
185. U.C.I.T.A. § 204(a) (2001).
186. Id. §§ 204(c)(1)(A)-(B).
187. Id. § 204(d).
188. Id. § 204(d)(1).
189. Id. § 204(d)(2).
190. Id.
191. U.E.T.A. § 5(d) (1999).
192. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(b)(1).
193. C.C.F. art. 1810 (Mex.).
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VI. FORMS AND EVIDENCE OF A CONTRACT...
Some of the laws discussed here, though giving the parties
ample liberty to establish the terms and requirements of their
contracts, also require certain elements to be present in order to
make a valid contract. Under the UCC, for example, the law
requires that any contract for the sale of goods over $500 be in
writing and indicate at least the quantity because, in the event
of a disagreement, a transaction is not considered valid for more
than its indicated value even though the writing is not
considered insufficient just because it omits or incorrectly states
an agreed upon term;195 this provision is known as the statute of
frauds.196 However, the UCC also permits parties to contract for
sale even when the price is not settled.197 In such cases, the court
may determine what is a reasonable price under the contract by
taking into account the market value of the goods.'98
Under the UCC, for a writing between merchants to confirm
a contract, it is sufficient to form that contract if it is received
within a reasonable time and if the receiving party has reason to
know its contents, unless a written notice of objection to its
contents is given within ten days after it is received.' 99
The CISG does not require a contract of sale to be concluded
in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other form
requirement. The existence and validity of the contract "may be
proved by any means, including witnesses."200 The states whose
legislatures require that contracts for the sale of goods be
evidenced in writing may make a declaration indicating that
neither Article 11 nor the exception to Article 29 will apply
where any party has his place of business in that state.20 1 The
exception to Article 29 provides that, if a written contract
contains a provision requiring any modification or termination
to be in writing, it may not be otherwise modified or terminated
194. Reference, infra, TABLE 5: FORM AND EVIDENCE OF THE CONTRACT.
195. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2002).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 2-305(1).
198. Id. § 2-305(1)(c).
199. Id. § 2-201(2).
200. C.I.S.G., Apr. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 671, art. 11.
201. Id. arts. 12, 96.
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by agreement. 20 2 "However, a party may be precluded by his
conduct from asserting such a provision to the extent that the
other party has relied on that conduct."
20 3
UCITA is a little stricter. This law indicates that any
contract requiring payment of a contract fee of $5000 or more is
"not enforceable by way of action or defense unless: the party
against which enforcement is sought authenticated a record
sufficient to indicate that a contract has been formed ....
However, a document satisfies this requirement even when "it
omits or incorrectly states a term, but the contract is not
enforceable beyond the number of copies or subject matter
shown in the record" unless performance was tendered by one
party and accepted by the other or if the party against which
enforcement is sought admits in court that a contract was
formed. 20
Additionally, UCITA establishes that a record between
merchants confirming the contract is sufficient to form the
contract if it is received within a reasonable time and if the
receiving party has reason to know its contents unless a written
"notice of objection to its contents is given in a record within 10
days after the confirming record is received."2 6 The parties can
agree that "the requirements of this section need not be satisfied
as to future transactions .... 20 The statute of frauds, as in
U.C.C. § 2-201, of other laws does not apply to a transaction
within the scope of UCITA.
208
Alternatively, UETA indicates that "a record or signature
may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it
is in electronic form."20 9 It also provides that "a contract may not
be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an
electronic record was used in its formation"210 while E-SIGN
202. Id. art. 12, 29(2).
203. Id. art. 29(2).
204. U.C.I.T.A. § 201(a)(1) (2001).
205. Id. §§ 201(b), (c)(1)-(2).
206. Id. § 201(d).
207. Id. § 201(e).
208. Id. § 201(f).
209. U.E.T.A. § 7(a) (1999).
210. Id. § 7(b)
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authorizes the use of electronic signatures and records for
contract formation related to interstate or foreign commerce.2 1'
UETA also establishes that in an automated transaction, "a
contract may be formed by the interaction of electronic agents of
the parties, even if no individual was aware of or reviewed the
electronic agents' actions .... In accordance with this Act,
a contract may also be formed by the interaction of
an electronic agent and an individual, acting on
an individual's own behalf or for another person,
including by an interaction in which the
individual performs actions that [he] is free to
refuse to perform and which the individual knows
will cause the electronic agent to complete the
213transaction or performance.
Under UETA, an electronic agent "means a computer program
or an electronic or other automated means used independently
to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or
performances in whole or in part, without review or action by an
individual."214
In Mexico, when civil and commercial legislation requires a
written contract and a signature in the corresponding
documents, these requirements are satisfied for electronic
messages-information generated, sent, received, filed, or
communicated through electronic, optical, or other technological
means-as long as the information can be attributed to the
obligated parties and the information is made available for later
consultation. Where a juridical act must be given in a verified
instrument, the verifying authority and the contractual parties
are allowed to express the exact terms agreed to by 'the parties
through electronic communications; the verifying authority must
indicate the elements through which that information may be
attributed to each party and keep an identical copy for later
consultation according to any applicable law.215 This is the basis
211. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(1).
212. U.E.T.A. § 14(1).
213. Id. § 14(2).
214. Id. § 2(6).
215. C.C.F. arts. 1834, 1834-bis (Mex.); see also COD.COM. art. 90 (Mex.).
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to start considering the existence and utilization of electronic
protocol in the near future.
The Mexican Federal Code of Civil Procedure and the
Mexican Commercial Code recognize the probative value of
information generated, sent, received, or filed by electronic,
optical, or other technological means. The trustworthiness of the
method used to transmit is considered to estimate the probative
value and, where possible, to attribute to the obligated parties




Consideration, as it is known in the English language, is a
unique characteristic of American contract law. Although not
expressly stated in statutory form, the common law indicates
that a contract generally requires mutual consideration from the
parties to be valid. There is no clear definition as to what
consideration is. However, the courts seem to have uniformly
adopted the definition suggested in Allegheny College v.
National Chautauqua County Bank, indicating that
consideration is sufficient if there is a legal detriment that
induces the party to make the promise.218
One of the most controversial situations in American
contracts with regard to consideration occurs when deciding if a
promise alone is sufficient to form a contract. American common
law uses the consideration doctrine to decide these cases. This
doctrine requires that a contractual promise be made as a result
219
of a negotiation. Under this doctrine, negotiation refers to the
voluntary acceptance of an obligation by one party conditioned
upon an act or omission of the other.220 Therefore, consideration
assures that the promise enforced as part of the contract is not
accidental, casual, or gratuitous but was made after deliberation
216. C.F.P.C. art. 210-A (Mex.); see also COD.CoM. arts. 1205, 1298-A.
217. Reference, infra, TABLE 6: CONSIDERATION.
218. See Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 159
N.E. 173, 714 (N.Y. 1927).
219. Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W.2d 661, 665 (Minn. 1960).
220. Id.
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manifested by reciprocal negotiation.221
The requirement of detriment indicates that the accepting
party gives up something of value or circumscribes his liberty in
some way.222 In other words, the accepting party must suffer a
223legal detriment as part of the negotiation. That is to say, the
party offers its promise in exchange for what the other party
sacrifices. The requirement of consideration invalidates two
transactions: promises to make a gift, which do not satisfy the
requirement of negotiation; and commercial promises in which
one of the parties has not given consideration, even when
224
circumstances appear to indicate otherwise.
Although consideration plays an important role in regular
contracts, in commercial transactions it is not a major concern
since most commercial contracts are clearly bargained-for
exchanges where the price for the promise is clearly identified.
25
Therefore, there are now very few cases in which a lack of




The modern era and the benefits offered by technological
progress create an opportunity to carry out commercial
transactions around the world with ease. At the same time, new
problems and questions related to the appropriate manner to
carry out modern transactions. Although modern law tends
toward uniformity in laws and regulations of modem
transactions, certain aspects of contract may still cause
controversy.
One should remember that under U.S. common law the
basic principle of contracts is the presumption that a contract is




224. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 2.5, 2.13 (3rd ed. 1999).
225. Arthur L. Rosett, Fundamentals of Contract Law, in 1 UNITED STATES
LAW OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT 3-iii, 3-13 to 3-14 (Boris Kozolchyk & John F.
Molloy eds., 2001).
226. Id. at 3-14.
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person, either acting on his own behalf or someone else's. The
convenience, computerized communication offers, threatens this
basic principle because, obviously, computers do not have the
capacity to think or evolve, even though, computers can work on
their own within their programmed parameters. Essentially,
computers are allowed to make decisions and respond to certain
situations with or without human participation.
In purely electronic transactions, the most important legal
determination concerns the establishment of an offer and an
acceptance through electronic messages absent written
documentation and the human intervention of an automatic
exchange. Also, electronic transactions create controversies over, .• 228
when the offer, acceptance, or rejection is effective.
The means of electronic contract also create issues unique to
this field in reference to the determination of whether a valid
acceptance has taken place. Those issues confront the reality
that U.S. common law of contracts assumes the decision to
accept or reject an offer occurs through a person, or through the
achievement of human decisions and discretion. The common
law presumes that an effective acceptance should be
communicated with knowledge of the offer and with the intent to
accept. However, intent is measured through objective
manifestations, not subjective ones. This means that one
assumes that the person responding to an offer means what his
expression indicates, unless circumstances clearly indicate
otherwise. Therefore, in regular contract law, the excuse, "I did
not mean to say what I said," does not carry much weight.
Similarly, the excuse, "I did not mean to say what my computer
said," might not be appropriate when characteristics of the
electronic response are aimed at inducing the other party (or
their computer) to believe they have formed a valid contract.
Thus, the fact that a completely automatic acceptance takes
place does not mean that there is not adequate acceptance of the
electronic offer. In creating a contract, one deals with the
apparent intention of the party establishing the electronic
227. Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic Contracting: Legal Issues, 14 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 211, 212 (1996).
228. Id. at 214.
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229
system of acceptance.
229. Id. at 217.
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